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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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CB

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (30 Mar 72)

DAFD-OTT

14 April 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, 50th Transportation Group, and Transportation Terminal Battalion

Operational rept. for period ending 31 Oct 71.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

11 22 Mar 72

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

2 Inc

1. DAFD-OTT-712015,  
2. DAFD-OTT-712132

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AVCD-TTBP-CO

10 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned  
Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional)  
Period Ending 30 October 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

2. (C) Lessons Learned - Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence: None.
- c. Operations:

(1) (C) Heavy Lift Capabilities.

(a) Observation: A requirement presently exists for two (2) heavy lift, mobile or crawler type, cranes at DWP.

(b) Evaluation: Present heavy lift capabilities are not adequate to sustain optimum port performance.

(c) Recommendation: Additional heavy lift capability be augmented to the 264th to meet present operational requirements.

(2) (C) Asphalt and Cement Storage.

(a) Observation: Asphalt drums continue to be stored unpalletized and unbanded. Cement bags are torn and deteriorated.

(b) Evaluation: Individually shipped containers of asphalt and damaged bags of cement constitute a great loss of time in discharging deep draft vessels.

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AVOD-TTBP-CO

10 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned  
Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional)  
Period Ending 30 October 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) Recommendation: All aspha't should be palletized and banded. All pallets of cement should be wrapped in cardboard or plastic covering to protect contents and reduce spillage.

(3) (C) Highly Pilferable and Security Cargo.

(a) Observation: The shipments of highly pilferable and security cargo on regular pallets creates a security problem at the port.

(b) Evaluation: Staging highly pilferable and security cargo creates an unnecessary security problem at the port, primarily due to the manner of shipment and the amount of time stored at the port before called for by the consignee.

(c) Recommendations: Highly pilferable and security cargo should be shipped in conex containers, banded and sealed, when possible. Close coordination between port operations and consignees for effecting timely clearance (same day) would help eliminate a large percentage of pilferage.

(4) (C) Utilization of Barge Assets, 1098th TC (MB)

(a) Observation: Additional controls over the utilization of unit barge assets is necessary.

(b) Evaluation: Port operations, through harbor master, directs the movements of barge assets in conjunction with off-loading and backloading vessels. Movements affecting location of barges and other pertinent information concerning barge utilization requires close coordination with the servicing unit.

(c) Recommendation: Procedures should be implemented between the 1098th and user activities to insure that barge assets are properly secured and accounted for.

d. (U) Organization: None.

e. (U) Training: None.

f. (U) Logistics

(1) (C) Supply Requisitioning Problem - Lashing Gear and Banding Material.

(a) Observation: The 264th Transportation Company (TS) does not receive lashing gear and banding material in adequate quantity.

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AVCD-TTBP-CO

10 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned  
Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional)  
Period Ending 30 October 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) Evaluation: Depot does not have adequate stock of lashing gear or banding material to meet present requirements.

(c) Recommendation: USAKV should inquire of USAD, Da Nang, of shortages of this material. Depot should maintain accurate account over materials on hand and outstanding due-outs.

(2) (c) Supply Requisitioning Problems.

(a) Observation: A high percentage of YFU's and LCH-3's have been deadlined because of a critical lack of spare parts.


(b) Evaluation: Sufficient parts for repair and replacement have not been adequately pre-stocked and high priority requisitions are slow in arriving. Further, higher echelon maintenance has been extremely limited, due to a shortage of trained personnel, necessary equipment and facilities.

(c) Recommendation: MMAV review outstanding spare parts requisitions from boat units, and insure that requisitions received are processed quickly and revalidated.

g. Communications: None.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

  
EDWARD I. HICKMAN JR.  
LTC, TC  
Commanding

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11  
AVCD-TCCO (10 Nov 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Transportation Terminal  
Battalion (Provisional), Period Ending 30 October 1971  
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (R2) (U)

Commanding Officer, 5th Transportation Command, APO SF 96349 18 November 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, ATTN: AVCD-GO,  
APO SF 96349

TO: Assistance Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded IAW AR 525-15 is the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional).
2. Concur with basic correspondence, no further comment required.

*Orvil C. Metheny*  
ORVIL C. METHENY  
COL, TC  
Commanding

9

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**07 JAN 1972**

AVCD-00-0 (10 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional), Period Ending 30 October 1971 [RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)] (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang, APO 96349

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-01, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, Transportation Terminal Battalion (Provisional) and concurs with it except as modified by the below paragraphs.

a. Page 1, para 2c (1) (a). This unit has been contacted and requested to submit a formal request for the items needed through supply channels.

b. Page 2, para 2f (1) (a). Lashing gear and banding material is in critical short supply throughout RVN. This shortage has been experienced by many units however, new policies have been established by USAFV to ensure availability of these materials in the future.

c. Page 3, para 2f (2) (a). Due to present draw down of troops and assets in RVN availability of spare parts as well as qualified personnel will become more critical as time goes on. Items being shipped to RV are at absolute minimum. Proper use of supply channels and procedures, particularly Red Ball should however, produce required items. Due to continued drawdown and requisition approval centralized at ICCV there will be a longer time lag than previously experienced. Follow-up on requisition and re-validation is unit responsibility and should be handled with the same care and sense of urgency associated with item desired itself.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Stanley M. Foscutt*  
STANLEY M. FOSCUTT  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG

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//  
AVHDO-DO (10 Nov 71) 3d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Transportation Terminal  
Battalion (Provisional) Period Ending 31 October 1971 RCS  
CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 FEB 1 1972

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

The Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 has been reviewed and adequately reflects the unit's operations during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
CPT. A. G. L.  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
USASUPCOM-DNG  
Trans Ter Bn (Prov)

13  
AVGI

30 Nov 71

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) for Period Ending 30 September, (RSC: CSFOR-65(R3)) (Cont'd)

2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence: None.
- c. Operations: See Annexes B, C and D.
- d. Organization: See Annex A.
- e. Training: None.
- f. Logistics: None.
- g. Communications: None.
- h. Material: None.
- i. Other: None.

4 Incl

- 1. Annex A, Evolution of TMA
- 2. Annex B, Airlift
- 3. Annex C, Land Movements
- 4. Annex D, Sealift

  
BERNARD J. CONROY  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

DAFD-OTT  
712132

Incl 2

15  
28 JAN 1972

AVHDO-DO (30 Nov 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 507th Transportation Group  
(Movement Control) for Period Ending 30 September, (RSC: CSFOR-65(R3))

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: \Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

HQ DA (DAFD), Washington, D. C. 20310

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 September 1971 from Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J.E. CHILDRESS  
CPT AGC

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

*K*

GPOP-FD (30 Nov 71) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 507th  
Transportation Group (Movement Control), Period  
Ending 30 September 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 FEB 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. I. Mah*

M. I. MAH  
1LT, AGC  
1LT AG

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## EVOLUTION OF TMAJ48

### 1. 507TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP.

#### a. BACKGROUND.

(1) For the first six years of its history in Vietnam, the MACV Traffic Management Agency was basically organized from the 507th Transportation Group MTOE. The MTOE provided 323 Army personnel, and through Inter-Service Agreements the Group was supplemented with 47 additional Air Force and Navy personnel. The Group was assigned to USARV for all purposes except operational control. MACVJ4 had staff supervision and control over the traffic management activities. At the height of its operation, the 507th was located in twenty-three (23) locations throughout Vietnam with five (5) Regional Headquarters. The Group Headquarters was organized with all the logistical and administrative overhead required to support these activities.

(2) The TMA/507th Commander had the same concerns and responsibilities as any commander in a war zone, and in some respects, his problems were compounded in that the activities were scattered throughout Vietnam from Can Tho to Quang Tri. Support was provided from the Group Headquarters in Saigon. The only outside support required was satelliting these small offices on other units for rations and billets. The commander had to devote a considerable part of his time in areas of command interest and required a full staff to support this organization. However, by having a separate command with his own morning report, property book, personnel section, supply section etc., the organization was extremely flexible and responsive in adapting to changing requirements in order to accomplish the mission. The commander could, and on many occasions did, direct the closing and establishment of field locations and directed the transfer of equipment and personnel accordingly.

#### b. DISCUSSION.

(1) The reason for changing what was a well functioning organization was the requirement to reduce personnel, eliminate as many positions as possible and not infringe on the ability to accomplish the basic mission of traffic management. At this point in time, all TMA field elements were located in fully developed base camps and were co-located with USARV Support Command activities. This made it possible to assign the field elements to the Support Commands for logistical and administrative support and allowed the TMA/507th to reduce all of its administrative and logistical



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overhead while maintaining operational control over the traffic regions.

(2) The new TMAJ48 operates similar to any MACV staff element. The three Traffic Regions are now assigned to the Support Commands and are located in close proximity to each Support Command Headquarters. This eliminates many minor problems inherent in an activity being supported by a geographically separated headquarters. The Chief, TMAJ48 is the OER Rating Officer of the Region Commander, and the SUPCOM Commander is the Indorser.

c. CONCLUSION. The results of reorganization of the headquarters are clearly evident in the old and new organizational structures attached as Tables 5 and 6 respectively. A 65 percent reduction (87 personnel) with no loss in ability to accomplish the mission provides sound justification for reorganizing.

## **2. TMA - MCC MERGERS.**

### **a. BACKGROUND.**

(1) In conjunction with the reorganization of Headquarters 507th into a staff element of MACVJ4, the Movement Control Centers (MCC's) of the USARV Support Commands were merged with the TMA Traffic Regions. Prior to the merger, a dual traffic management structure existed within each Support Command. The MCC's had responsibility for the management and utilization of highway assets used in the Common User Land Transportation System (CULT) and TMA had a similar responsibility for Rail, Sea and Air Movements. Each Support Command MCC had Transportation Movement Offices (TMO's) which paralleled the field elements of the TMA Regions. Whenever a shipper had cargo to move by highway or LCU type watercraft, he went to the local MCC office. The MCC office passed the commitments of the mode operators to TMA if it appeared more logical to use Air, Rail, or MSC controlled Sea assets. This dual system caused duplication of effort and diffusion of traffic management service and control.

(2) The need to consolidate and reorganize our support effort throughout Vietnam provided an initial opportunity to test a TMA/MCC merger concept in Qui Nhon on 1 January 1971. The test proved satisfactory to all concerned and was expanded to Cam Ranh Bay on 1 March 1971. After a series of briefings, an exchange of messages between MACV and USARV, and personal discussions between MACVJ4, DCofS Logistics, USARV, and DCG, USARV it was agreed, on 31 July 1971, to accomplish the remaining mergers on 1 October 1971, coincident with the reorganization of Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group.

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b. DISCUSSION.

(1) In the planning for the development of the TMA/MCC organization, it was agreed that the Support Commands would determine on a daily basis how many trucks were available for commitment for line haul operations, that is, available for TMA/MCC. This would be based on relative priorities of port and beach clearance, local haul, as well as line haul requirements. Also, no vehicles would be committed outside the Support Command's area of operations without prior approval of the Support Command.

(2) The resultant interface and relationship between USARV Support Commands, TMAJ48, TMA/MCC Regions and the Shippers is shown in the diagram attached as Table 7. All shippers - Army, Navy, Air Force, DOD Agencies, and Free World Forces - submit cargo offerings to the local TMA/MCC office where the applicable priority is determined in accordance with the Integrated Priority System established by MACV Directive 55-4. The Traffic Region Headquarters selects the mode that will satisfy the shipper's total requirements. If rail, highway or LCU type watercraft are used, the Traffic Region passes the requirement directly to the mode operator. The only basic change in this procedure from that previously used is that one traffic manager works the system instead of two.

(3) The Support Commands retain an option on commitment of assigned CULT assets. TMAJ48 will get involved only on a management by exception concept. Highway and Rail operations are purposely decentralized to gain maximum flexibility and responsiveness. However, TMAJ48 retains centralized control over those Air and Sea modes which routinely permeate beyond the Support Command boundaries.

c. CONCLUSION.

(1) The duplication of effort between the local MCC and TMA offices was eliminated, which not only improved efficiency, but also resulted in substantial personnel savings. The merger at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon saved 21 spaces. The mergers at Long Binh and Da Nang each saved 22 spaces. A few of these savings were support personnel no longer required due to reorganizing under the command of the Support Commands, but most of the savings were operational positions eliminated as the direct result of the merger.

(2) Cargo is moved in these areas by a single manager who has the authority to consider all the modes to accomplish the move and select the most economical and/or responsive mode that will satisfy the shipper's total requirements.

(3) The system has been simplified. Having a single manager, single priority system and single point of contact have resulted in an easily identified entity and streamlined shipment procedures.

(4) TMAJ48 has a theater-wide overview of total transportation assets. This gives TMAJ48 maximum planning information to adjust these assets to meet shifting requirements.

(5) The resultant organization is shown at Table 8.

## AIRLIFT

### 1. PASSENGER MOVEMENTS FOR AMERICAL DURING DRAWDOWN.

**OBSERVATION:** The 23rd Infantry Division was not supplying DTO, Chu Lai with accurate figures for personnel needing in-country air transport for DEROS, ICT, or leave and R&R. As a result many CSAS and SMAR flights were improperly utilized, either too few seats were filled or not enough seats were available for passengers.

**EVALUATION:** DTO Chu Lai made repeated attempts to get accurate personnel planning figures until the morning of the passenger movement. The Adjutant General, 23rd Infantry Division, requested that USARV expedite order processing for departing personnel.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That reassignment processing be accomplished earlier in the stand-down schedule so that accurate movement forecasts can be made resulting in more efficient utilization of aircraft.

### 2. CSAS SCHEDULED CARGO MISSIONS.

**OBSERVATION:** Prior to 28 August 1971, aerial port cargo in RVN was moved on the basis of cargo generation, i. e., after an aerial port reached a given level of cargo in the port an aircraft would be set up against the requirements.

**EVALUATION:** This resulted in RDD's not being met and a lack of confidence on the part of the users of airlift in the aerial port system. This system also led to an unnecessary number of SMARs. With commencement of scheduled cargo missions, beginning 28 August 1971, an increased emphasis was placed on challenging SMARs going into the aerial port system. The result is that a higher proportion of air eligible cargo is now being moved via the routine port system with a corresponding decrease in the tonnage being moved by SMAR (See Table 9).

**RECOMMENDATION:** That special attention be given to the reduction of recurring SMARs, and when possible, that these requirements be moved by other less costly modes of transportation.

## ANNEX "B"

### 3. TURN-OVER OF U.S. AIR BASES TO VNAF.

**OBSERVATION:** On 1 August 1971, air passenger and cargo operations at Nha Trang AFB were turned over to VNAF with the understanding that all passenger and cargo aerial port functions would be performed by VNAF.

**EVALUATION:** No problems were encountered in passenger operations as a result of the turn-over. TMA ATCO continued the booking of passengers, and VNAF PAX service personnel processed passenger flights. Cargo operations could not be performed by VNAF personnel because insufficient MHE was on hand, VNAF personnel were not trained in MILSTAMP procedures, and no capability existed to place cargo requirements into the USAF airlift system. Further, VNAF had no capability to assume responsibility for staging port cargo. As a result CSAS cargo operations had to be terminated at Nha Trang and shifted to Cam Ranh Air Base.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That air bases scheduled for turn over to VNAF, where aerial port functions in support of Free World Forces continue to exist, detailed plans be developed to:

- (1) Provide for adequate MHE to handle all FWF, SMAR/Port cargo.
- (2) Provide for secure staging and proper documentation of cargo.
- (3) Maintain a capability to put FWF cargo backlog into the USAF airlift system.

### 4. KEYSTONE MOVEMENT.

**OBSERVATION:** During July - August 1971, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Keystoned out of LZ English to CONUS. Personnel departed from Phu Cat Air Force Base on 12 flights with a total of 1868 passengers, and 3588 M/T of cargo were shipped out of Qui Nhon Port.

**EVALUATION:** As a result of lessons learned from the Keystoning of the 4th Infantry Division, close coordination was effected with all elements involved early in the planning phases. Movement was planned in two phases (a) from the field to the Keystone processing site and (b) from the Keystone site to the APOE/WPOE. Brigade personnel were trained in cargo documentation and placed with an ATCO representative in the Keystone processing

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center to assist in the preparation of passenger lists. Movement of personnel from Keystone area to APOE was accomplished by bus and backed up by CH 47. Hot line telephones with Brigade representatives were established at Phu Cat ATCO. Conex were used to the maximum extent for the sealift cargo of the Brigade. As a result of the close coordination and detailed planning by all elements involved in the movement, the Keystoning of the 173rd Airborne Brigade was accomplished without any major problems.

RECOMMENDATION: That TMA representatives be included in all Keystone planning conferences, and that aforementioned procedures become standardized and implemented throughout RVN for Keystoning units.

## RAIL

### 1. IMPROVED RAIL TERMINAL FACILITIES, ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH (ADLB)

**OBSERVATION:** During the reporting period rail utilization at the Long Binh Depot increased significantly.

**EVALUATION:** The rail system within the 3rd Military Region is primarily port clearance. Newport is operational 24 hours per day where as the primary consignee ADLB is operational 12 hours per day. The constraint in the rail system is at ADLB. TMA 3rd Traffic Region arranged to have a VNRS switch engine and VNRS representative with a radio, stationed at the depot to expeditiously switch empty and loaded rail cars. This action has assisted in improving rail car turn around.

**RECOMMENDATION:** TMA 3rd Traffic Region recommended that lights be installed at the rail dock for night operation. This was accomplished. It was also recommended that the other off load site be paved to expedite the handling of freight in that area. The recommendation was favorably received, however, funds are not available at this time. Through the 3rd Traffic Region's efforts additional fork lifts and shuttle trucks have been employed in support of the rail activity at the Depot.

### 2. INCREASED UTILIZATION OF VNRS BY RVNAF

**OBSERVATION:** The VNRS currently operates on a deficit budget which requires a government subsidy of approximately \$VN 8,000,000 per month. Ninety-five percent of cargo moved by the VNRS is DOD sponsored cargo.

**EVALUATION:** The requirement for rail support of US Forces will be subject to continuous reduction in future months as US Forces are withdrawn from RVN. The rail system currently has limited capability to provide transport for RVNAF. There is a potential in using rail to move cargo between the port of Saigon and the ARVN depots. There is a rail spur in the Port of Saigon, and although there are four major depots in the Saigon area located adjacent to the rail line, none have rail spurs into the depots. During the months of July, August and September there were approximately 15,000 S/T's, 12,000 S/T's, and 29,000 S/T's of cargo respectively moved out of the Port of Saigon by truck. The majority of it is consigned to ARVN Depots.

ANNEX "C"



**RECOMMENDATION:** The VNRS have been requested to perform a survey to determine the economic feasibility of constructing rail spurs into the ARVN Depots. The RVN Joint General Staff - Central Logistics Command has promised to give full support in the conduct of the survey.

### **3. OVERLAND SHIPMENT OF SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.**

**OBSERVATION:** In the past, TMA has received requests to move serviceable vehicles to inland destinations from the port or depot area. The responsibilities and procedures for effecting these movements was, on occasion, a matter of debate.

**EVALUATION:** A TMA policy was established to guide other shippers and TMA field elements in this area. The policy established the following guidelines:

- a. If the vehicle is being transferred from one unit to another involving only a property book or hand-receipt transfer the offering will be challenged and the shipper requested to relocate vehicle using organic capability.
- b. If the vehicle is being transferred from a supply activity servicing customers on an area basis or is being shipped to or from depot stock or being moved inland from port of debarkation, the offering will be passed to the local highway mode operator for movement on a "drive away" basis.
- c. If it is known that the vehicles are being delivered for eventual turn-over to RVN or Third Country forces, coordination with appropriate Advisory Unit will be effected to arrange for title transfer at point of origin. Onward transportation would be responsibility of recipient.
- d. No offering will be accepted for shipment within a 30 mile radius, from point of shipment, if roads to destination are open for convoy operations.
- e. Prior to selection of a vehicle for "drive away", determination will be made with shipper that vehicle is in driveable condition.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That consideration be given to promulgating a similar policy world-wide for guidance of Installation and Base Transportation Officers.



## **SEALIFT**

### **1. SCHEDULED LST AND BARGE SERVICES**

**OBSERVATION:** Scheduled LST and barge services between Intra-RVN ports were attempted between 20 May 1971 and 4 June 1971 resulting in low utilization of assets.

**EVALUATION:** Fourteen of the scheduled seventeen LST runs were either ahead or behind schedule. Eight of the LST's had below average loads due to schedule commitments. In the thirteen barge runs scheduled, all runs failed to meet the prescribed schedule.

**RECOMMENDATION:** For optimum utilization of assets, minimize attempts at fixed movement schedules for LST's or barges within RVN. The present method of shipment is based on the individual deployment of vessels in response to specific requirements. This type of operation is characterized by known cargo requirements and vessel selection based on availability of shipping and location of cargo. If a vessel is to be dedicated it must be conclusively shown that a responsive service cannot be provided any other way.

### **2. BARGE OPERATIONS IN NEWPORT AND SAIGON**

**OBSERVATION:** With few exceptions, barge operations in the US port of Newport and the ARVN port of Saigon are characterized by long loading/offloading delays.

**EVALUATION:** Due to the heavy cargo requirements in the ports of Newport and Saigon necessitating the emphasis on deep draft and LST operations, barge cargo operations are adversely affected. Berthing space and lower priority of barges prevent their expeditious handling.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That barge operations in these ports be minimized. Increased emphasis should be placed on handling barge cargo in Vung Tau where the cargo handling capabilities are more conducive to barge operations.

**ANNEX "D"**

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### 3. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MSCOV ASSETS DURING PERIODS OF PEAK ACTIVITY

**OBSERVATION:** In Sep and Oct 71, MR I had over 40 unit moves in progress with firm RDD's. During this period MSCU Da Nang assumed operational control of assigned assets, and issued cargo clearance orders to meet these commitments with success.

**EVALUATION:** Being "Closer to the picture", and deeply involved with US units having firm movement dates, MSCU Da Nang and TMA Da Nang jointly controlled the movement of LST's and barges located in MR I. This function is normally controlled by MSCOV and HQ TMA located in Saigon. By decentralizing control during this period of peak activity; hours and sometimes days were saved in scheduling vessels to meet firm RDD's. At the time of this report more than 20 moves have been completed under this method with success.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That when a situation such as the above arises again in MR I or MR II, this method of decentralized vessel control be again considered.

### 4. DELAY IN RETURN OF VESSEL MANIFESTS

**OBSERVATION:** Effective 1 June 1971 manifests for out-of-country ocean sailings from Da Nang are prepared in Newport by the 4th Terminal Command's computer rather than locally by the 5th Transportation Command. However, a delay of approximately two weeks is experienced between the vessel sailing and the return of the manifest to Da Nang.

**EVALUATION:** This delay derives from the paper flow between 5th Transportation Command and 4th Terminal Command. Newport receives the Transportation Control Movement Documents reflecting the loaded cargo only after the vessel has sailed. At this time data elements have to be screened from the source TCMD's and key-punched for insertion in the data base used to produce the manifest. This is a time-consuming, yet essential, step.

**RECOMMENDATION:** In an effort to speed the return of manifests to Da Nang, TMA, 1st Traffic Region, on a daily basis, now provides 5th Transportation Command with flimsy copies of all TCMD's offered for export in advance of providing the hard copy documents which constitute individual vessel bookings. 5th Transportation Command forwards these flimsy copies to the 4th Terminal Command for immediate key-punching and insertion into the data base. When a vessel sails, 5th Transportation Command notifies the 4th Terminal Command of those Transportation Control Numbers actually loaded. Since documents have already been entered into the system, the

4th Terminal's computer can expeditiously search its data base and produce a timely manifest.

## **5. SHIPMENT OF RETROGRADE AMMUNITION**

**OBSERVATION:** Requirements exist to move retrograde ammunition from the subports of Chu Lai and Tan My to Western Pacific destinations. Normally this would involve shipment of the cargo to Da Nang for transshipment to the ultimate destination.

**EVALUATION:** Transshipment through Da Nang is generally required for retrograde from Chu Lai and Tan My for three reasons: the inability of deep draft vessels to call at either Chu Lai or Tan My; the requirement that retrograde ammunition be inspected by the Coast Guard; and a Preventive Medicine Unit inspection. Transshipment of retrograde ammunition through Da Nang is hampered by the influx of inbound ammunition to Da Nang. This influx limits port lighterage and staging capability for retrograde ammunition.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Since there is sufficient tonnage at these subports to constitute adequate LST loads, it is feasible to ship some retrograde to destinations directly from the subport via LST. A check with the Officer in Charge of the local Coast Guard Explosive Loading Detachment revealed the primary concern of the inspection team to be the loading of deep draft vessels. LSTs loaded directly from these subports would not require USCG inspection. Coordination with the Support Command, ACofS, Transportation enables a Preventive Medicine Unit to be dispatched to the subport to inspect the cargo prior to movement off-shore. Headquarters TMA will request clearance for LST's to carry retrograde ammunition directly from the subport to the ultimate destination. This improved procedure should continue to be utilized as long as there is sufficient tonnage to justify the use of an LST.

## **6. RESHIPS FOR INTRA-RVN SEALIFT**

**OBSERVATION:** Coordination between CO, TMA/507th and CO, 124th Trans Comd, CRB, established a requirement for a REPSHIP (Report of Shipment) system between RVN ports to provide the next port of call with sufficient information on the ship's stow, available space, and actual boom capacities to allow for proper pre-stow planning. A REPSHIP format was developed at 2nd Region TMA in coordination with the 124th Trans Comd and was implemented throughout Vietnam.

**EVALUATION:** The REPSHIP is basically a port to port communique designed to facilitate greater efficiency, and a more cost effective movements system. TMA's interest in the system is primarily to achieve the highest stowage and/or tonnage capacity possible. While the concern of TMA is evident for management reasons, the success of the system is primarily achieved through close cooperation between the water terminal operators. Proper manifesting, accurate data, and timely reporting are necessary to make the REPSHIP system pay dividends. If any of the port operators fails to report, or fails to take cognizance of the information provided, the system breaks down, and the efforts of the other party have been wasted. The support of the port personnel is essential if TMA is to be capable of calling forward the proper amount of cargo to fill a specific clearance.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That USARV consider establishing a REPSHIP system on a required basis using either their own communication means, or TMA's dedicated teletype circuits to transmit between ports.

#### **7. OVERSHIPMENT OF ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL TO THE DELTA**

**OBSERVATION:** Large quantities of engineer construction materials have been shipped to the Delta.

**EVALUATION:** When original estimates for Engineer Construction on the Lines of Communications Reconstruction (LOC) program were completed the engineer units requisitioned shipments of construction material in bulk. As the requirements lessened due to revisions and construction waivers the quantities offered for shipment did not decrease accordingly. At the same time no effective supply mechanism seemed to exist to divert offerings to areas where valid construction requirements did exist. As a consequence, large quantities of lime and cement were damaged or had to be transferred to the RVNAF.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That Engineer Command and ICCV intensively monitor requests for construction material to the Delta and revalidate all present requirements.

#### **8. RORO RESUPPLY OF PERISHABLE RATION TO THE DELTA**

**OBSERVATION:** RORO service to the Delta required improvement in view of under utilization of LST and PAC Barge assets.

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**EVALUATION:** The primary purpose of the RORO operation is to resupply the Delta with perishable rations and to reduce US Military exposure on RVN highways. All other cargo shipped on RORO had to be generated thus frequently resulting in prime assets sailing light.

**RECOMMENDATION:** TMA has substituted an AB&T Barge 605 with a fast tug in place of the LST and PAC Barge. Because of the increased speed Can Tho can be resupplied every 3-4 days utilizing only one barge.

#### **9. SHIPMENT OF DAMAGED OR DETERIORATED CARGO INTO LONG BINH DEPOT**

**OBSERVATION:** Cargo shipped to Long Binh Depot from Cam Ranh Bay Depot has been received at Vung Tau in a deteriorated condition.

**EVALUATION:** Vung Tau has received approximately 300 pallets of paper bags and 500 pallets of paper cups shipped to Long Binh Depot that are deteriorated and awaiting inspection at Vung Tau to determine if this cargo should be destroyed at Vung Tau.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That future shipments which appear to be in a deteriorated condition be inspected to determine if the cargo is usable prior to shipment avoiding unnecessary transportation.

#### **10. RORO TRAILERS**

**OBSERVATION:** Numerous RORO trailers are discharged at Vung Tau with flat tires and damaged landing gear.

**EVALUATION:** Trailers arriving at Vung Tau with flat tires or damaged landing gears cannot continue on to destination until repairs are made. Repair teams must be dispatched from Long Binh. Frequently trailers are out of service 10 to 14 days.

**RECOMMENDATION:** TMA has made the recommendation to MSCOV that AB&T contract be amended to provide a tire changing service (serviceable tires provided by the 4th TC) and minor landing gear repair service.

#### **11. NEWPORT LST RAMP PROPOSAL**

**OBSERVATION:** TMA conducted a staff study on the increased shallow draft shipping from/to Newport for the period August 1971 through January 1972. The results of the study showed that due to the closing of USAD Cam Ranh

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Bay and a drawdown of forces in the Delta, Newport will increase from an average of 70,000 M/T monthly to 100,000 M/T over the next six months. The staff study was sent to DCSLOG USARV to determine the feasibility of constructing another LST ramp at Newport.

**EVALUATION:** The two (2) existing LST ramps in Newport have a total shipping capability of only 40,000 M/T of cargo per month. Therefore, the present 70,000 M/T per month Intra-RVN requirement necessitates the use of deep draft shipping berths at Newport which, in turn, reduces retrograde shipping capability. During the month of July 1971, over 102 lost days at a cost of over \$175,000 were attributed to LST's having to await berthing in Newport. The immediate advantage of an additional LST ramp would be the elimination of the aforementioned problems, and in addition large ramp barges could make use of the new facility.

**RECOMMENDATION:** TMA requested DCSLOG USARV conduct a study the cost of converting the old LCU Ramp to an LST Ramp. The innovation of a new LST Berth was favorably accepted for further study. However, USARV's cost analysis and construction time estimate revealed that construction of an additional LST Ramp at Newport would be excessive in cost and too late in completion to meet the immediate expected increases of Intra-RVN shipping.

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# CSAS PASSENGER MOVEMENTS




TABLE I



# RAIL INCIDENTS

34




TABLE 2



# RAIL CARGO IN STONS

## RAIL CARGO SUMMARY





TABLE 3

# NUMBER OF RAIL PASSENGERS

36




RAIL PASSENGER SUMMARY

TABLE 4

31

OLD TMA/507TH HEADQUARTERS (UNTIL 1 OCT 71)




HQ TMA/507TH SPACES 32 OFF 101 EM

TOTAL 133

TABLE 5

# TMAJ48 STAFF ELEMENT

37




TMAJ48 SPACES 17 OFF 29 EM  
TOTALS: 46

..... OPERATIONAL CONTROL

TABLE 6


39



-----	OPERATIONAL CONTROL	
-----	COMMAND	..... MODE MANAGEMENT & COMMITMENT
TABLE 7		

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**NEW ORGANIZATION**  
(EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1971)



**TOTALS: 46 MACV SPACES**  
**227 USARV SPACES**

----- **OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

**JMATCO - JOINT MILITARY AIR TRANSPORTATION COORDINATION OFFICE**  
**DTO - DISTRICT TRAFFIC OFFICE**

**TABLE 8**




TABLE 9

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Security Classification

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQDA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310		Confidential	
		2b. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs 507th Transportation Group and Transportation Terminal Battalion for Period Ending 31 Oct 71			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 507th Transportation Group - CO, Transportation Terminal Battalion			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
22 March 72			
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.		712015	
c. N/A		712132	
d.		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310	

13. ABSTRACT

**CONFIDENTIAL**



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Security Classification

14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
<p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>						

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(This page is unclassified)

Security Classification